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 We evaluated several variants of a variable biofuel subsidy and compared 
them with the fixed subsidy and Renewable Fuel Standard.  We used two 
different modeling approaches. First we used a partial equilibrium model 
encompassing crude oil, gasoline, ethanol, corn, and ethanol by-products.  
Second, we used a stochastic simulation model of a prototypical ethanol plant.  
From the partial equilibrium analysis, it appears the variable subsidy provides a 
safety net for ethanol producers when oil prices are low; yet, it does not put 
undue pressure on corn prices when oil prices are high.  At high oil prices, with a 
variable subsidy, the level of ethanol production is driven entirely by market 
forces.  From the plant level stochastic analysis, essentially the same 
conclusions are reached.  The variable subsidy can provide essentially the same 
expected NPV as the fixed subsidy but with a lower risk for the producer, a lower 
probability of a loss from the investment, and often at a lower expected cost to 
government.  Finally, in the U.S., the ethanol industry is up against a blending 
limit called the blend wall.  If the blending wall remains in place, it does not 









 The United States has used and continues to use a variety of incentives to 
promote development and operation of the ethanol industry.  Since the Energy 
Policy Act of 1978, ethanol has received a tax credit of one sort or another 
(Tyner, 2008a).  Today the main incentives are the volumetric ethanol excise tax 
credit (VEETC) of 11.9 cents per liter of ethanol blended, the Renewable Fuel 
Standard (RFS) (U.S. Congress, 2007), and a small producer tax incentive.  
There is also a tariff on imported ethanol of 14.3 cents per liter plus 2.5% of the 
value of the import.  At today’s prices, the total import tariff is about 15.6 cents 
per liter (Taheripour and Tyner, 2008).  The imported ethanol is eligible for the 
11.9 cent blender credit, so the net tariff is 3.7 cents per liter.  All of these direct 
financial incentives are fixed amounts per liter of ethanol or other biofuel 
produced and blended with gasoline.  This paper focuses on the subsidy and 
RFS. 
 The RFS is a mandate requiring blending of an amount specified each 
year of each type of biofuel.  The timing and quantities of the RFS are illustrated 
in Figure 1.  Corn ethanol is in the category called conventional biofuels and 
reaches a plateau of 56.8 billion liters per year in 2015.  Current national capacity 
including shut down plants is about 47.3 billion liters with another 7.6 billion 
under construction (Renewable Fuel Association), so we are near the 56.8 billion 
liter plateau for the RFS.  Economically, the RFS functions somewhat like a 
hidden variable incentive because it requires gasoline type fuel vendors to use a 
specified amount of biofuel regardless of its price or the price of crude oil and 
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gasoline.  So at $40 per barrel of crude oil, the implicit incentive is much greater 
than at $100 crude oil, and the incentive goes away at higher oil prices as the 
market actually produces more than the mandated amount, if there are no other 
constraints such as a blending wall.  We will discuss this issue later when we 
evaluate the RFS compared with other policy options. The basic objective of this 
paper is to provide an economic analysis of the fixed subsidy, variable subsidy, 
and Renewable Fuel Standard. 
Basic economics of the current market and policy options 
 Figure 2 displays the basic economics of the fixed subsidy and a non-
binding RFS.  A non-binding RFS is one that is below the level that is being 
produced by the market.  That has been the case historically.  The market has 
always produced a quantity greater than the RFS, so the RFS has no real effect 
on market price or quantity.  The fixed subsidy just shifts up the market demand 
curve by the amount of the subsidy (note that the demand for ethanol represents 
the blender derived demand).  In other words, because the blender receives the 
VEETC credit, s/he is willing to pay up to 11.9 cents more per liter than would be 
the case without the subsidy. In this case, the RFS is drawn to the left of the 
intersection of the supply curve and the market demand curve.  Thus, the RFS 
has no impact on either market price or quantity.  Market price (P*) and quantity 
(Q*) are determined by the intersection of the supply curve and the demand plus 
subsidy curve.  If there were no subsidy, the market price and quantity would be 
Pm and Qm.  The ethanol producer gets the difference between P* and Pm of the 
subsidy with the rest going to the blender.  The sharing of the subsidy between 
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the ethanol producer and the blender depends on the supply and demand 
elasticities (Taheripour and Tyner, 2007). 
Figure 3 shows the case of a binding RFS.  For this case, the RFS is to 
the right of the intersection of the supply curve and the demand plus subsidy 
curve.  The mandated quantity of ethanol is the level of the RFS, and the price is 
PRFS.  Thus, for quantities of ethanol less than the RFS, the demand curve is 
vertical at the RFS quantity (totally inelastic).  The price (PRFS) is given by the 
intersection of the RFS line and the supply curve.  The market price for ethanol 
and the market quantity are higher than they would be in the absence of the 
binding RFS. In this case, the ethanol producer should receive PRFS for each unit 
of ethanol produced at the mandated level of RFS. However, the economic value 
of ethanol at the RFS is just Pb, the intersection of the demand with no subsidy 
and the RFS line. The difference between PRFS and PB can be considered as a 
rent (or reduction in losses) for ethanol producers. When there is a government 
subsidy, the subsidy has no impact on the quantity or price of ethanol – it just 
changes the allocation of the rent. 
  In the case of the non-binding RFS, the subsidy induced higher ethanol 
production.  With the binding RFS, the subsidy has no impact on ethanol 
production or price.  As noted before, the ethanol demand curve is derived from 
the gasoline demand and is defined uniquely for each oil price.  Each increase in 
the oil price would induce an outward shift in the demand for ethanol, which 
eventually (as shown in Figure 2) would render the RFS non-binding again, and 




 Figure 4 illustrates the economics of a binding blend wall.  We developed 
this framework to represent the current U.S. ethanol market condition. A blend 
wall is a physical or technical constraint on the amount of ethanol that can be 
blended.  In the U.S. currently, it is dictated by the 10 percent blending limit.  
However, we cannot blend 100 percent of gasoline, so the effective blend wall is 
around 9 percent or less, or somewhere between 42 and 45 billion liters of 
ethanol (Tyner and Taheripour, 2008b). Moving down the demand plus subsidy 
curve from left to right, the market demand is the demand up to the blend wall.  
At that point, no more ethanol can be absorbed because of the physical blending 
limit.  So at the blend wall, the demand plus subsidy curve becomes vertical, and 
the market price is the intersection of the blend wall and the supply curve.  The 
market price in Figure 4 (PBW) is lower than P* and Pm. In this case the subsidy is 
shared between the consumer and blender with none going to the ethanol 
producer. The subsidy has no impact on market quantity because that is set by 
the physical limit of the blend wall. But in this case, the blend wall forces the price 
down to the supply curve at the blend wall quantity.  Essentially, that explains 
why we observe shut down capacity in the current condition.  We are at or near 
the effective blend wall, and more ethanol is being offered to the market than can 
be absorbed, so the price falls.  Essentially, in the presence of blending wall 
ethanol moves from being priced primarily by the crude and gasoline prices to 
being priced primarily by the corn price.  In this case, the price of corn will be the 
major determinant of ethanol price. In the presence of blending wall capacity 
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comes in or out based on changes in the price of corn relative to ethanol.  
Currently, the blend wall is the biggest issue facing the ethanol industry. 
 The policy analysis that follows assumes the blending wall problem is 
solved.  It is important to understand that if the blending wall remains effective, 
then none of the other policy options effectively matter.  The RFS cannot be 
enforced because the EPA cannot require blenders to blend that which they 
cannot legally blend.  The subsidy, whether fixed or variable, does not matter 
because it all goes to the consumer and the blender and not to the ethanol 
producer. 
Policy Analysis 
 In our prior work, we have evaluated variable incentives compared with 
the fixed VEETC and RFS (Quear and Tyner, 2006; Tyner and Taheripour, 
2008a; Tyner, 2007a; Tyner, 2007b; Tyner, 2008b; Tyner and Quear, 2006; 
Tyner and Taheripour, 2008d). However, we have not performed a detailed 
evaluation of different variants of the variable incentive.  In this paper we define 
several variants of a variable biofuel subsidy and compared them with the fixed 
subsidy and RFF using a partial equilibrium model which links the US energy and 
agricultural market (Taheripour and Tyner 2008). In addition, we develop a 
stochastic cost-benefit analysis framework to compare impacts of the variable 
and fixed subsidies on the profitability of a representative ethanol producer under 
uncertain conditions. The stochastic model simulates uncertainty in crude oil, 
gasoline, and corn prices, and calculates the plant investment net present value 
distribution under a fixed and variable type incentive.  The stochastic model is 
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designed to reflect the inherent market uncertainty from the perspective of a 
representative ethanol plant.   
 Since the existing fixed subsidy expires in 2010, Congress will be 
compelled to act on it in one way or another in 2010. Hence it is important to 
provide additional information on possible options in choosing future directions. 
The rest of the paper is divided into the following sections:   
1) An analysis of different variable and fixed subsidy options and the RFS. 
2) An analysis of the same fixed and variable subsidy options using a 
stochastic ethanol plant financial analysis model. 
3) Summary and conclusions of the research. 
Evaluation of policy options  
 To perform our policy analyses we first update our partial equilibrium 
model to expand the set of options evaluated.  Appendix A contains a summary 
of the model and an explanation of how it works.  The two main changes made in 
the model for this analysis are as follows: 
1) In previous work we have included a 5% gasoline demand shock to 
account for growth in income and population over time.  This shock is 
independent of the standard linkage between the price of gasoline and 
quantity demanded.  For this paper, we have eliminated the demand 
shock for two main reasons:  (1) Because of the recession, incomes have 
fallen, and demand has fallen due to that income effect; and (2)The 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) (U.S. Congress, 
2007) contains a requirement for a substantial increase in automobile fuel 
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economy by 2020.  Thus, for any given population and income, gasoline 
demand will be lower because of the increase in the Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard. 
2) We changed the linkage between the cost of producing corn and the price 
of crude oil.  There is, of course, still a link between the crude oil price and 
the corn cost of production.  However, in 2009, the link between the price 
of crude oil and the price of natural gas has been disrupted.  There have 
been substantial new discoveries of natural gas in the U.S., which have 
caused the price of natural gas to plummet.  The price of natural gas today 
is no more than 1/3 what it was a year ago.  Natural gas is the main 
ingredient in producing nitrogen fertilizer – a main cost component for corn 
production.  So while we retained the link between the corn production 
cost and the price of crude oil, we cut the oil price coefficient in half for this 
analysis. 
 The variable subsidy, as we have defined it in the past, has two 
components:  the trigger price of oil below which the subsidy takes effect and the 
rate of increase in the subsidy as the oil price drops below the trigger price.  For 
example, if the subsidy is triggered when the crude oil price drops below $80 and 
increases at a rate of 0.50 cents per liter per dollar of change in the crude price, 
the applied subsidy at various oil prices would be as shown in Table 1.  The 
variable subsidy could be operated on either a monthly or quarterly basis.  For 
example, if a quarterly basis were used and the crude oil price were $60 in 
quarter one, then the subsidy on ethanol produced in quarter two would be 
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$0.15/l. of ethanol according to Table 1.  The same approach would apply if 
assuming a monthly basis. 
 In the analysis that follows, we display results for the following options: 
• Fixed subsidy of 11.9 cents/liter 
• Fixed subsidy of 6.6 cents/liter 
• Variable subsidy starting at $70, $80, and $90 of crude oil price per barrel  
• Variable subsidy with a rate of increase of 0.40, 0.46, and 0.53 cents/liter 
per dollar drop in the crude oil price (run at each oil price starting point) 
• RFS of 56.8 billion liters 
• No subsidy or RFS 
In these cases we assume that there is no blending wall. In this analysis ethanol 
producers will receive a share of the subsidy, whether fixed or variable, 
depending on the market conditions and elasticities of the demands for and 
supplies of gasoline, ethanol, and corn.  Furthermore, we assume that the RFS is 
fully enforced.   
 Results from this model are numerous.  First, Figure 5 compares ethanol 
production under alternative policies. In particular, this figure compares four 
policies: the fixed 11.9 cent subsidy, a variable subsidy starting at $90 crude oil 
with a 0.46 cents/liter rate of increase, no subsidy, and the RFS.  Several 
important points emerge from this first set of results: 
• Crude oil price must be at least $60 for there to be any ethanol production 
if there is no subsidy or RFS. 
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• At low oil prices, the variable subsidy option results in greater ethanol 
production than the fixed option. 
• At oil prices below $80, the RFS results in greater ethanol production than 
either the fixed or variable subsidy.   
• At oil prices greater than $80, the fixed subsidy yields greater ethanol 
production than any of the other options.  As we will see below, it also 
induces higher corn prices than the other options. 
• At oil prices above $80, the variable subsidy and no subsidy options 
produce the same results because the variable subsidy ends at $90. 
• At oil prices of $120 and higher, the no subsidy, variable subsidy, and 
RFS options all yield the same results.  There is no subsidy at these oil 
prices for the variable subsidy, and the RFS is no longer binding, meaning 
the market is producing more than the mandated 56.8 billion liters. 
 Figure 6 contains the corn price results for the same policy alternatives 
mentioned above.  The main conclusions with respect to corn prices are as 
follows: 
• Corn price is higher under the variable subsidy than the fixed subsidy for 
crude prices of $60 and below. 
• Corn price goes to $255/mt at $160 crude oil under the fixed subsidy, 
about $34/mt higher than the other options. 
 Figure 7 contains the results of the same simulations for corn exports.  
The main conclusions regarding corn exports are as follows: 
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• Corn exports are higher at low oil prices for the fixed and no subsidy 
cases compared to the variable subsidy and RFS cases.  That stands to 
reason because the variable subsidy and RFS are a more potent incentive 
for ethanol production at low oil prices than either the no subsidy or fixed 
subsidy cases.  In particular, there is no ethanol production at low oil 
prices without the subsidy, so more corn gets allocated to exports. 
• At high oil prices, the RFS and variable subsidy lead to a lower drop in 
exports than the fixed subsidy case.  At high oil prices, the RFS is no 
longer binding, and the variable subsidy is the same as no subsidy since 
the variable subsidy ends at $90 crude oil in this case. 
• At $80 crude oil, the variable subsidy yields higher exports than either the 
RFS or fixed subsidy, which are about the same. 
 Next, we compare the $90 variable subsidy with three different slopes 
against the fixed subsidy at 6.6 cents.  The other cases are dropped from this 
graph for clarity of presentation.  Figure 8 contains the results for ethanol 
production, and Figure 9 for corn price.  Table 2 contains the complete ethanol 
and corn price results for all three starting points and rates of change.  For 
ethanol production and corn price, the variable subsidy yields higher levels at oil 
prices of $40 and $60, and the 6.6 cent fixed subsidy is about the same as the 
variable subsidy at $80 crude oil.  For crude oil of $100 or higher, the fixed 
subsidy yields both higher ethanol production and corn price.  For the variable 
subsidy beginning at $90, the higher slope of 0.53 cents/liter per dollar actually 
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results in higher ethanol production at $40 crude oil than at $100 crude because 
the subsidy grows to be quite large at low oil prices.   
 The 0.40 and 0.46 cents/liter per dollar rates of change produce more 
reasonable results with the $90 starting point in that the safety net is provided, 
but not so much as to change significantly the profitability as oil price increases.  
On the other hand, with the $70 starting point, the higher slope is needed to 
stimulate significant ethanol production at low oil prices.  The $80 case, as would 
be expected, is in between these two. 
 Based on these results, it appears that the variable subsidy can provide a 
safety net for periods of low oil prices, while not providing a stimulative effect 
when oil prices are higher.  We now turn to the analysis of these options 
performed using an ethanol plant level model.  
Ethanol plant simulation model based analysis 
 The ethanol plant based simulation analysis is performed using a modified 
plant level model (Dale and Tyner, 2006a, b; Perkis et al., 2008).  The model was 
previously used to evaluate new technology options in corn ethanol production.  
It was modified for purposes of this analysis to permit stochastic analysis of the 
ethanol plant profitability.  While a number of changes were made, we will 
summarize briefly here the main changes that are important to this paper: 
• Crude oil price is uncertain.  The price in year one of production is taken 
from a triangular distribution.  The base case is the DOE IEA 2009 Energy 
Outlook base range for year 2011, with a minimum of $53, most likely 
value of $62, and maximum of $102.  We also ran a second case with a 
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maximum value of $65, which yields an average starting price of $61 
(about the market value when this analysis was performed).  Then we 
simulated an annual percentage price change based on the variability of 
crude oil prices between 1981 and 2008.  All the market prices over that 
period were converted to real values using the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI).  The annualized inflation rate over this period was 3.2 percent.  
Using the Best Fit feature of the @Risk software add-in for Microsoft 
Excel, we found that a normal distribution fit the annual price changes 
quite well.  For this analysis we assume an average annual percent price 
change of zero and use the standard deviation from that distribution. 
• We estimated the historical relationship between crude oil and gasoline 
using monthly data for April 2006 – March 2009.  We found that using the 
natural log form for both crude and gasoline prices worked well and 
explained 88% of the variability of the gasoline price by the crude oil price.  
The residual in this estimation makes the gasoline price only a bit less 
dependent on the crude oil price. 
• We also estimated the link between crude oil and corn over this same 
period, again assuming the natural log form for prices, but this relationship 
was not as strong explaining 25 percent of the variability.  In this case the 
regression residual introduced considerable corn price variability. 




• For this paper, we assumed volumetric pricing of ethanol.  That is, we 
assumed the ethanol price equaled the gasoline price plus any subsidy in 
effect. 
• Even though the model allows the subsidy pass-through percentage to 
producers to be stochastic, we used 100% pass through in this analysis to 
have a good basis for comparison of alternatives. 
 The policy options examined in this part of the research were essentially 
the same as in the previous section, but we focused more on the rate of change 
of 0.46 cents/liter per dollar of crude oil price difference, as this rate appeared to 
work well in the previous section’s results.  One additional approach we added in 
this section is letting the starting point for the variable subsidy be held constant in 
nominal terms or be adjusted each year by the rate of inflation.  For example, in 
the nominal case, assuming a $90 starting point for the variable subsidy, the 
nominal level did not change over the assumed 25 year plant life (two years of 
construction and 23 of operation).  The real case increased the crude trigger 
price each year by the rate of inflation. 
 The simulations were performed with @Risk software (@Risk, 2008).  
@Risk is an add-in for the Excel spreadsheet that permits Monte Carlo 
simulation.  That is, it calculates the inherent uncertainty in all the output values 
given the uncertainty reflected (and described above) in input variables.  The 
spreadsheet is recalculated many times (we used 10,000 iterations for each 
simulation).   @Risk calculates the mean, standard deviation, and other 
parameters of the output distributions. 
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 The results for the nominal subsidy starting point are provided in Table 3.  
The first column contains the parameters of the system being simulated, with the 
variable subsidy systems denoting in parentheses both the trigger price and the 
rate of change ($/barrel crude, $/liter ethanol per $/barrel crude).  The column 
labeled “value” contains the non-stochastic results for the Net Present Value 
(NPV) after 25 years of construction and operation.  The columns labeled mean 
and SD are the average NPV and the standard deviation of NPV for each policy 
option.  The column labeled SD/mean is the coefficient of variation (CV), which is 
a standard measure of riskiness of the investment.  The column labeled “%<0” is 
the probability that the investment will result in a loss.  The two columns under 
subsidy NPV are the average and standard deviation of government subsidy 
costs.  Finally, the two columns under Govt NPV Revenue are the NPV average 
and standard deviation of the government’s net subsidy cost after allowing for 
government revenue from taxes paid over the plant lifetime.  The difference 
between the subsidy NPV and Govt. Rev. NPV is the NPV of taxes paid.  For 
example, for the fixed subsidy case, the NPV subsidy cost is $316 million, but the 
net cost is $145 million, so $171 million is the NPV of taxes paid over the 25 
years. 
 For the higher priced case from DOE (the average starting oil price is 
$73.55), it is instructive to compare the fixed subsidy (11.9 cent) case with the 
$100 starting point variable subsidy.  Note that the fixed subsidy mean or 
expected NPVs are similar to the values with no risk analysis, but the variable 
subsidy cases are substantially higher.  That is because it is only with the 
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stochastic analysis that one can get a true indication of the functioning of the 
variable subsidy.  Without the price varying each year, only the “expected” 
subsidy gets calculated.  Technically, the large difference occurs because the 
variable subsidy is a type of non-linear transformation that makes the 
deterministic spreadsheet case give very different results from the Monte Carlo 
simulations. The expected plant NPVs are $343 million and $326 million for the 
fixed and variable cases, respectively.  In other words the expected NPVs are 
about the same.  The coefficients of variation (CVs) are 0.95 and 0.73 for the 
fixed and variable cases respectively.  A higher CV means higher risk, so the 
variable subsidy case is less risky for the firm.  The probability of a loss is 6.6% 
for the fixed subsidy case and 0% for the variable subsidy case, another indicator 
of risk.  Finally, the expected NPV subsidy cost is $316 million for the fixed case 
and $289 for the variable case.  Thus the variable subsidy case costs the 
government less yet provides about the same expected NPV to the firm but at 
lower risk.  For the second case, with the projected crude oil starting price 
beginning at $61 in year 2011, the $90 trigger point for the variable subsidy has 
similar results.  For example, the fixed subsidy has a 12.3% probability of loss, 
while the variable subsidy loss probability is essentially zero.  In fact, all shaded 
rows represent policy options which both decrease the probability of a loss to the 
firm and lower the expected expense to taxpayers when compared to the fixed 
subsidy outcomes. 
 Table 4 provides the same results for the inflation adjusted trigger price for 
the variable subsidy.  In this case for the higher projected crude starting price of 
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$73.55, the inflation adjusted crude trigger prices of $70 to $80 yield results 
comparable to the fixed subsidy case except, as before, the variable subsidy 
involves less risk as measured by CV and probability of a loss.  For the projected 
crude starting price of $61, the $70 trigger price has a slightly higher NPV than 
the fixed subsidy case, but significantly lower risk.  For that case, the expected 
government subsidy cost is slightly higher as well.  It is logical that the subsidy’s 
crude trigger price for the inflation adjusted case would be lower than the fixed 
trigger price case.  In a sense, it is more flexible in that it adjusts higher with 
increases in inflation.  Figure 10 illustrates the win-win zone for both the real and 
nominal trigger prices.  The win-win zone is defined as the region in which firm 
risk goes down and government cost goes down. 
Other issues 
 In addition to the comparison of risk sharing and cost presented above, 
there are some other issues that merit consideration in the policy decision.  The 
two main categories are implementation issues and interaction of the subsidy 
policy with the RIN market. 
Implementation issues 
 As described briefly above, the variable subsidy would be implemented 
either on a quarterly or monthly basis.  It would make use of a publically available 
and reported crude oil price so that everyone in the market would be able to 
calculate or estimate the subsidy level for the following period.  There would be a 
lag of one period, so the Q2 subsidy would be calculated from Q1 oil prices.  
Once fixed for the quarter, the subsidy would be implemented just as under the 
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current system.  That is, blenders would take a deduction from their excise tax 
bill for the ethanol blended during the quarter using the subsidy value for that 
quarter.  So in that sense, there would be no difference in implementation 
between the current fixed VEETC and variable VEETC except that the level 
would change each period. 
 In periods of high volatility, it is possible that just before and after the 
subsidy level changed, firms would attempt to move up or back transactions to 
take advantage of higher subsidies in one period or the other.  It is not expected 
that this time arbitrage would pose significant problems, but it might merit further 
review. 
Relationship between the subsidy and RIN market 
 RINs (Renewable Fuel Identification Numbers) are the mechanism for 
enforcing the RFS.  At the end of each year, each fuel vendor must have enough 
RINs to satisfy its blending quota under the RFS.  When the RFS is not binding, 
RINs have little or no value because firms can easily meet the RFS blending 
quota. When the RFS is binding, the RIN value is driven by the difference 
between the market price with the binding RFS (PRFS in Figure 3) and the price 
that holds in the absence of the RFS (either P* or Pm in Figure 3 depending on 
whether or not there is a subsidy).  The subsidy is the vertical distance between 
the market demand and demand plus subsidy curves.  With a variable subsidy, 
the distance between the market demand curve and the market plus subsidy 
curve would vary each period (quarter or month).  Since the subsidy effectively 
reduces the value of the RIN, it is possible a variable subsidy would introduce 
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more volatility in the RIN market at low crude oil prices.  The RIN quota must be 
satisfied annually, and the variable subsidy could change quarterly, so that might 
introduce another complicating element into the RIN market when crude oil price 
is low. 
 It is impossible to quantify the magnitude of these effects.  The RIN 
market in recent months has been very stable with little trading activity.  There is 
no doubt that a variable subsidy adds another factor for blenders to consider, but 
one would expect that with some experience, market actors would become 
accustomed to the changes and adjust accordingly.  However, we have no way 
of estimating what additional cost market participants might incur, if any.  
Summary and conclusions 
 If the blending wall remains in place, it does not matter much what other 
policy options are used.  The RFS would have to be waived down to the blend 
wall level.  In the presence of the blending wall the subsidy (VEETC), whether 
fixed or variable, goes to the consumers, blenders, and refiners and not to the 
ethanol producer.  The policy analysis we did assumes the blend wall problem is 
solved. 
 We have evaluated several variants of a variable subsidy and compared 
them with the fixed subsidy and RFS.  In general, it appears the variable subsidy 
provides a safety net for ethanol producers and corn growers when oil prices are 
low; yet, it does not put undue pressure on corn prices when oil prices are high.  
At high oil prices, with a variable subsidy, the level of ethanol production is driven 
entirely by market forces and not by government interventions. 
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 From the plant level stochastic analysis, essentially the same conclusions 
are reached.  The additional information is that the variable subsidy can provide 
essentially the same expected NPV as the fixed subsidy but with a lower risk for 
the producer, a lower probability of a loss from the investment, and often at a 





Brief Model Description 
 
The model contains integrated markets of corn and gasoline (Tyner and 
Taheripour, 2008c; Tyner and Taheripour, 2008d). The supply side of the corn 
market consists of identical corn producers. They produce corn using constant 
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production functions and sell their product in a 
competitive market. Under these assumptions, we can define an aggregated 
Cobb-Douglas production function for the whole market. In the short-run, the 
variable input of corn producers is a composite input, which covers all inputs 
such as seed, fertilizers, chemicals, fuel, electricity, and so on. In the short run, 
capital and land are fixed. The demand side of the corn market consists of three 
users: domestic users which use corn for feed, food, and industrial purposes; 
foreign users, and ethanol producers. We model the domestic and foreign 
demands with constant price elasticity functions. The foreign demand for corn is 
more elastic than the domestic demand. The demand of the ethanol industry for 
corn is a function of the demand for ethanol.      
The gasoline market has two groups of producers: gasoline and ethanol 
producers. It is assumed that ethanol is a substitute for gasoline with no additive 
value. The gasoline and ethanol producers produce according to short run Cobb-
Douglas production functions. The variable input of gasoline producers is crude 
oil and the variable input of ethanol producers is corn. Both groups of producers 
are price takers in product and input markets. We model the demand side with a 
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constant price elasticity of demand. The constant parameter of this function can 
change due to changes in income and population. We assume that the gasoline 
industry is well established and operates at long run equilibrium, but the ethanol 
industry is expanding. The new ethanol producers opt in when there are profits. 
There is assumed to be no physical or technical limit on ethanol production – 
only economic limits (Tyner et al., 2008).  
The model is calibrated to 2006 data and then solved using Mathematica 
(Wolfram 1999) for several scenarios. Elasticities are taken from the existing 
literature. These parameters are presented in Table A1. Endogenous variables 
are gasoline supply, demand, and price: ethanol supply, demand, and price; corn 
price and production; corn use for ethanol, domestic use, and exports; DDGS 
supply and price; land used for corn; and the price of the composite input for 
corn. Exogenous variables include crude oil price, corn yield, ethanol conversion 
rate, ethanol subsidy level and policy mechanism, and gasoline demand shock 
(due to non-price variables such as population and income). For previous 
analyses, a 5% demand shock had been assumed, but it is dropped for this 
analysis as explained in the text. The model is driven and solved by market 
clearing conditions that corn supply equal the sum of corn demands and that 
ethanol production expands to the point of zero profit.   
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Table A1.  Major model parameters 
Parameter Value 
Own price elasticity of demand for corn for domestic use1 -0.1 
Own price elasticity for corn for exports1 -0.5 
Own price elasticity for corn supply2 0.4 
Own price elasticity for gasoline demand3 0.08 
Own price elasticity for gasoline supply4 0.4 
Own price elasticity for ethanol supply5 0.1 
DDGS price ($/ton)= 70.12 + 12.57 * Price of corn ($/bu)6  
Corn variable costs ($/bu) = 0.64 + 0.0123* oil price ($/bbl)7  
1. In this study we assign -0.1 to the domestic demand elasticity (a bit lower 
than normal) because we assume that DDGS is a perfect substitute for 
corn and it covers a portion of the domestic demand for corn. We assigned 
-0.5 to the elasticity of foreign demand for corn according to the Database 
for Trade Liberalization Studies (Sullivan et al. 1989).  
2. This parameter is based on Westcott (1998) and White and Shideed 
(1991). 
3. This parameter is taken from Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling (2006). 
4. This parameter is taken from Parry and Small (2003). 
5. Several papers has reported or used very inelastic supply functions for 
ethanol (examples are Miranowski (2007) and Rask (1998)). We also 
assigned a small value to the short run price elasticity of ethanol supply.  
6. This equation is taken from Tyner and Taheripour (2007). 
7. This equation if obtained from a time series for the period of 1975-2006.  
For the work on this paper, the equation was changed to corn = 0.64 + 
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Table 1.  Illustration of the Variable Subsidy Starting at $80 and Changing at 0.50 
cents/l./$ 
 
Crude Oil Price/bbl Subsidy (Cent/l.) 








Table 2. Simulation Results for a Range of Subsidy Start Points and Rates of 
Change 
Crude oil price $/bbl 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 
Ethanol production (Bil.l./yr.) 
Fixed subsidy (6.6 cents/l.)  0.0 25.1 47.6 62.3 72.7 80.5 86.5 
Variable: 0.40 cents/$1 below 
$90/l. 36.7 40.4 41.4 49.3 61.6 70.7 77.8 
Variable: 0.46 cents/$1 below 
$90/l. 47.8 45.9 43.0 49.3 61.6 70.7 77.8 
Variable: 0.53 cents/$1 below 
$90/l. 58.3 51.2 44.5 49.3 61.6 70.7 77.8 
Ethanol production (Bil.l./yr.) 
Fixed subsidy (6.6 cents/l.)  0.0 25.1 47.6 62.3 72.7 80.5 86.5 
Variable: 0.40 cents/$1 below 
$80/l. 22.5 29.0 31.8 49.3 61.6 70.7 77.8 
Variable: 0.46 cents/$1 below 
$80/l. 32.0 32.9 31.8 49.3 61.6 70.7 77.8 
Variable: 0.53 cents/$1 below 
$80/l. 41.2 36.7 31.8 49.3 61.6 70.7 77.8 
Ethanol production (Bil.l./yr.) 
Fixed subsidy (6.6 cents/l.)  0.0 25.1 47.6 62.3 72.7 80.5 86.5 
Variable: 0.40 cents/$1 below 
$70/l. 7.2 17.1 31.8 49.3 61.6 70.7 77.8 
Variable: 0.46 cents/$1 below 
$70/l. 15.0 19.1 31.8 49.3 61.6 70.7 77.8 
Variable: 0.53 cents/$1 below 
$70/l. 22.5 21.1 31.8 49.3 61.6 70.7 77.8 
Corn price ($/mt) 

























































Corn price ($/mt) 











Variable: 0.40 cents/$1 below 









































Corn price ($/mt) 
Fixed subsidy (6.6 cents/l.)  67.6 94.1 126. 156. 185. 213. 239.
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6 9 6 0 4 
Variable: 0.40 cents/$1 below 











Variable: 0.46 cents/$1 below 




































Annual Outlook Projected Crude Starting Price 
NPV, Financial w/tax Firm NPV Subsidy NPV Govt NPV 
revenue 
  Value Mean SD SD/Mean % < 0 Mean SD Mean SD 
Fixed Subsidy 355 343 326 0.95 6.6 316 0 -145 109 
Var. Subsidy 
(110,0.0046) 
267 381 222 0.58 0.0 376 248 -183 256 
Var. Subsidy (100,0. 
0046) 
216 326 239 0.73 0.0 289 217 -128 234 
Var. Subsidy (90,0. 
0046) 
178 281 252 0.90 0.3 213 183 -79 212 
Var. Subsidy (80,0. 
0046) 
162 240 269 1.12 3.8 147 147 -36 188 
Var. Subsidy (70,0. 
0046) 
162 209 288 1.38 17.3 95 113 -2 167 
No Subsidy 162 149 326 2.19 39.4 0 0 58 109 
                    
Volume Priced 
Ethanol 
Current Market Crude Starting Price 
NPV, Financial w/tax Firm NPV Subsidy NPV Govt NPV 
revenue 
  Value Mean SD SD/Mean % < 0 Mean SD Mean SD 
Fixed Subsidy 245 242 269 1.11 12.3 316 0 -179 89 
Var. Subsidy (110,0. 
0046) 
                  
Var. Subsidy (100,0. 
0046) 
191 282 178 0.63 0.0 383 215 -223 216 
Var. Subsidy (90,0. 
0046) 
132 225 190 0.84 0.3 290 187 -162 198 
Var. Subsidy (80,0. 
0046) 
84 176 209 1.19 4.8 206 158 -108 180 
Var. Subsidy (70,0. 
0046) 
55 129 223 1.73 26.1 131 124 -60 155 
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Annual Outlook Projected Crude Starting Price 
NPV, Financial w/tax Firm NPV Subsidy NPV Govt NPV 
revenue 
  Value Mean SD SD/Mean % < 0 Mean SD Mean SD 
Fixed Subsidy 355 343 326 0.95 6.6 316 0 -145 109 
Var. Subsidy (80,0. 
0046) 
228 373 216 0.58 0.0 363 261 -176 266 
Var. Subsidy (70,0. 
0046) 
162 309 241 0.78 0.1 257 213 -107 234 
Var. Subsidy (60,0. 
0046) 
162 258 268 1.04 1.7 172 165 -51 202 
Var. Subsidy (50,0. 
0046) 
162 218 290 1.33 14.6 108 118 -10 172 
No Subsidy 162 149 326 2.19 39.4 0 0 58 109 
                    
Volume Priced 
Ethanol 
Current Market Crude Starting Price 
NPV, Financial w/tax Firm NPV Subsidy NPV Govt NPV 
revenue 
  Value Mean SD SD/Mean % < 0 Mean SD Mean SD 
Fixed Subsidy 245 242 269 1.11 12.3 316 0 -179 89 
Var. Subsidy (70,0. 
0046) 
144 252 180 0.71 0.0 330 221 -188 222 
Var. Subsidy (60,0. 
0046) 
52 181 195 1.08 2.6 217 175 -116 190 
Var. Subsidy (50,0. 
0046) 
52 132 221 1.67 23.4 136 129 -63 161 




Figure 1.  Renewable Fuel Standard 
 
Figure 2.  Ethanol Subsidies and Non-Binding RFS 
 
Figure 3.  Ethanol Subsidies and Binding RFS 
 
Figure 4. Impact of Tariff removal with Binding RFS and Low Cost Imported Ethanol 
 
Figure 5.  Base Comparison of Ethanol Production under Subsidy Options and RFS 
 
Figure 6.  Base Comparison of Corn Price under Subsidy Options and RFS 
 
Figure 7. Corn Exports Under Alternative Policy Options 
 
Figure 8. Ethanol Production under Different Fixed and Variable Subsidy Options 
 
Figure 9. Corn Price under Different Fixed and Variable Subsidy Options 
 
Figure 10.  Win-win Cases for Nominal Oil Trigger Price 
 
Figure 11.  Win-win Cases for the Real Oil Trigger Price  
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Biomass-based Diesel 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.89 2.46 3.03 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79
Non-celulosic Advanced 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.76 1.14 1.89 2.84 3.79 5.68 7.57 9.46 11.36 13.25 13.25 13.25 15.14
Celulosic Advanced 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.95 1.89 3.79 6.62 11.36 16.09 20.82 26.50 32.18 39.75 51.10 60.57



























































































































































































Breakeven Crude Trigger Prices of Variable Subsidies
(in comparison to fixed subsidies)
Breakeven on government Breakeven on %<0 firm NPV
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